The Impact of Corruption Distance on Ownership Strategies of Spanish and Portuguese MNEs

Mariana Pedrosa Faria, Fernando Carvalho, Nuno Rosa Reis


The ownership strategy of foreign subsidiaries is an important decision for multinational enterprises (MNEs). Previous research has analyzed the effect of country dimensions on this strategy, both from the home and the host country. In this paper we delve into the effect of differences between home and host country on the MNEs’ ownership strategies. Empirically, we analyze the influence of corruption distance on the ownership strategies of Spanish and Portuguese MNEs, using data from 3,941 foreign subsidiaries. We found that the higher the absolute corruption distance between Spain (or Portugal) and the host country, the higher the ownership controlled by MNEs. However, when the host is more corrupt than the home country, MNEs have a lower ownership level in the local subsidiaries.




Corruption Distance; Ownership Strategy; Home-Host Differences; Portugal; Spain.


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